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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SUNDAY CLOSING LAW-WHETHER A STATUTE
FORBIDDING THE SALE OF AUTOMOBILES ON SUNDAY IS CONSTITUTIONAL-The
recent case of Courtesy Motors v. Ward,1 adds another phase to Sunday clos-
ing legislation in Illinois. Courtesy Motors challenged the constitutional valid-
ity of a 1961 act of the legislature2 which forbids the sale, barter or exchange
of automobiles on Sunday. The act imposed a fine3 and a possible suspension
of the dealer's license where the provisions were not complied with.4 Any
citizen could obtain an injunction against a violator of the act.5 The legis-
lation which the court dealt with was limited only to the dosing of automo-
bile dealers and not to any other fields of enterprise. The trial court upheld
the validity of the legislation but on direct appeal to the Supreme Court8
the case was reversed. The court decided that the legislative act was un-
constitutional under Article 4, Section 227 of the Illinois Constitution.8
They declared that the classification made by the legislature bore no rational
connection with preserving Sunday as a day of rest, in that observing Sun-
day as a day of rest is not unique to the automobile industry, for no reasons
were shown why legislation should apply only to the automotive industry.
It would be well at this time to consider the grounds on which Cour-
tesy contested the legislation and to dispel certain issues which were con-
ceded. The main thrust of Courtesy's argument centered around Section 22
of Article 4 of the Illinois Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution. Courtesy did not contend that the act in-
fringed on their freedom of religion 9 in view of four recent United States
1 24 Ill. 2d 82, 179 N.E.2d 692 (1962).
2 11. Rev. Stats., 1961, ch. 121Y, par. 282, § 2, provides that it is unlawful for any
person to "keep open, operate or assist in keeping open or operating any place or premises
or residences, whether open or closed, for the purpose of buying, selling, bartering or ex-
changing . . . any motor vehicle, whether new or used, on the first day of the week,
commonly called Sunday." Eleven other states have enacted laws of a similar nature ban-
ning the sale of new or used automobiles at retail on Sunday. Colorado Revised Statutes,
1953, § 13-20-1 to 13-20-3; Connecticut General Statutes Revised, 1958, § 53-301; Florida
Statutes Annotated, 1957, § 320.272 [2nd Hand Dealers]; Burns Indiana Statutes Annotated,
1956, Replacement Volume, § 10-4305; Michigan Statutes Annotated, 1960, § 9.2701 through
9.2703; Minnesota Statutes Annotated, § 168.275; New Jersey Statutes Annotated, § 2A:171-
1.1; Oklahoma Statutes Annotated, T.21, § 917 to 19; Purdom's Pennsylvania Statutes An-
notated, 1945-1957, T.18, § 4699.9; Rhode Island General Laws, 1956, § 31-5-19; and West's
Wisconsin Statutes Annotated, § 218.01(3)(a)21.
3 Ill. Rev. Stats. 1961, chap. 121Y2, par. 283, § Sa.
4 Id. at § 3b.
5 Id. at § 4.
6 Direct appeal is provided for in all cases where a construction of the constitution
is involved. Ill. Rev. Stats. 1961, chap. 110, § 75(1).
7 Ill. Const., Art, IV, § 22, provides a list of subjects upon which there shall be no
special legislation, none of which are relevant here. It then concludes with a general pro-
vision that "in all other cases where a general law may be made applicable, no special law
shall be enacted."
8 Supra, n. I at 846.
9 U.S. Const., Amend. 1, prohibits Congress from enacting laws designed to establish
an official religion.
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Supreme Court opinions10 which held that the closing of certain activities
on Sunday did not interfere with an individual's right under the First
Amendent.
Although some doubt exists as to its correctness, which will be dissussed
later, the opinion of the Court can only be appraised in the light of the
background of Sunday legislation in Illinois. Unlike the great majority of
other states," Illinois has never had a general closing law. Indeed, even
taverns and saloons can operate freely on Sundays so long as local authori-
ties grant their approval; 12 and such approval has been granted in the City
of Chicago.' 3 Prior to the new Criminal Code,14 which has only a general
disorderly conduct prohibition, the only statute which even came close to
being a general Sunday law was a provision in the former Criminal Code15
which merely prohibited the disturbance of the peace on Sunday by labor,
noise, route or amusement.
Before an analysis can be made under Section 22 of Article 4, the first
question is whether Sunday closing is within the sphere of the police power?
The Court has held in the affirmative. 16 Section 22 of Article 4 provides a
limitation on the exercise of the police power. Its requirements are that the
classification rests upon some attribute marking a class as a proper object
for special legislation. In Rudulph Express Co. v. Bibb,17 the Court held
that when a statute is assailed under this section it will use the same test as
in Fourteenth Amendment cases. This test does not prohibit legislative
classification, but does require that the legislative classification rest upon a
reasonable basis and apply uniformily to all members of the class upon
which it operates.' 8 The test of reasonableness pervades the opinions of the
Supreme Court.
The first case in Illinois dealing with Sunday closing was Eden v.
People,19 in which a Sunday closing law applied only to barbers. The Court
struck down the statute on the ground that it constituted class legislation.
The court aptly stated that the legislation was not calculated to promote
the health, safety and morals of the community. Eden was careful to point
out that classification per se is not unconstitutional, but to be constitutional
10 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown
Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Gallagher
v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
11 A complete list of statutes is contained in Appendix II to the opinion of Mr.
Justice Frankfurter in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 551-60 (1961).
12 Ill. Rev. Stats. 1961, Ch. 43, § 129.
13 Municipal Code of Chicago, § 147-13.
14 Ill. Rev. Stats. 1961, Ch. 38, Art. 26.
15 111. Rev. Stats., 1959, Ch. 38 § 550.
16 McPherson v. Village of Chebanse, 114 Ill. 46, 28 N.E. 454 (1885). See also McQuil-
lin, Municipal Corporations, § 24.188; 50 Am. Jur., Sundays & Holidays, § 9; 83 C.J.S.,
Sunday, § 3D.
17 15 Ill. 2d 76, 79-80, 153 N.E. 2d 820 (1958).
18 See also: People v. Wilcox, 237 Ill. 421, 423-4, 86 N.E. 672 (1908).
19 161 Ill. 296, 43 N.E. 1108 (1896).
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the classification must bear some relation to the health, safety and morals.
The court felt that the legislature could not single out a class harmless in
itself.20 Then followed the cases of City of Springfield v. Richter2' and City
of Clinton v. Wilson2 which upheld general Sunday closing ordinances
similar in nature, which exempted from its operation certain enumerated
exceptions. The Court rested its decisions on Section 22 of Article 4, stating
that there was a justification for the ordinances because there was a sub-
stantial difference between the classes of employment prohibited and those
excepted. Next to come before the court was City of Marengo v. Rowland23
in which the Eden decision was cited and followed. The court struck down
an ordinance requiring the closing of barber shops only on Sunday. Forty-
two years after Eden came City of Mt. Vernon v. Julian24 which clarified the
Sunday legislation phase to a great extent. The ordinance in question was of
the general variety, but contained numerous exceptions. The court held the
ordinance to be unconstitutional on the ground that the distinctions made
in the ordinance were arbitrary and without relation to the health, safety,
morals and welfare of the community. The court expressly overruled the
City of Springfield and City of Clinton line of cases, stating that not even
the legislature could pick and choose the categories, but the distinctions
between classes prohibited and those excepted must bear a relation to the
health, safety, morals and welfare of the community.25
The next cases to come before the court were Humphrey Chevrolet v.
Evanston2 6 and Pacesetter Homes Inc. v. South Holland.27 A dissection of
these cases along with the Courtesy decision lends credence to the view that
the court either failed to give complete recognition to Humphrey and Pace-
setter or reverted to the historical policy of Illinois that restraints on the
freedom of enterprise should be kept at a minimum. At the very outset the
court had by implication, at least, already determined that the automobile
sales industry is a proper subject for the legislative exercise of sovereign
police power and that an enactment, requiring the Sunday closing of that
industry, does in fact protect the public health, safety and morals and pro-
motes the general welfare. In Humphrey the Court examined the validity
of a municipal Sunday closing ordinance. It was comprehensive in nature
and, with certain exceptions, prohibited the operation of retail and whole-
20 Supra, n. 19 at 308.
21 257 Ill. 578, 101 N.E. 192 (1913).
22 257 I1. 580, 101 N.E. 192 (1913). The ordinance applicable to these cases read:
"Whoever shall on Sunday keep open or permit to be kept open, his place of
business, or shall pursue his daily labor or occupation within said city, shall on
conviction be fined not less than $10 nor more than $50: this section shall not be
applicable to persons who conscientiously observe some other day of the week as
the Sabbath, nor in cases of necessity or of charity, nor to hotels, eating houses,
drug stores, tobacco stores, barber shops or livery stables."
23 263 Ill. 531, 105 N. E. 285 (1914).
24 369 Ill. 447, 17 N. E. 2d 52 (1938).
25 Supra, n. 24 at 452.
26 7 I1. 2d 402, 131 N. E. 2d 70 (1955).
27 18 111. 2d 247, 163 N. E. 2d 464 (1959).
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sale businesses on Sunday.28 The plaintiff, an automobile dealer, challenged
the constitutional validity of this enactment. The Court observed that the
ordinance constituted a reasonable exercise of police power and that the
plaintiff failed to advance any persuasive reasons to show that it was un-
reasonable as to him. Accordingly, the validity of the ordinance was upheld.
In Pacesetter the Court considered a municipal Sunday closing ordinance,
which was directed at business activity generally with certain specified
exemptions. One of the plaintiffs was engaged in the construction and sale
of homes and complained that the ordinance prevented it from merely ex-
hibiting its houses or having them open for inspection on Sundays. The
Court stated that there was no showing that this business affected or en-
dangered the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. Since harmless
as well as harmful businesses were prohibited, the validity of the entire
ordinance could not be sustained. An appraisal of Humphrey in the light
of the decision in Pacesetter leads only to one conclusion-the Court was
obliged to determine that the Sunday closing of an automobile agency did,
in fact, promote the health, comfort, safety or welfare of society in order
to sustain the validity of the Evanston ordinance. If the automotive sales
industry was not detrimental to the public health, safety and morals, the
decision in Pacesetter would dictate a contrary result. The Evanston ordi-
nance then would have included a harmless business. Pacesetter teaches that
an ordinance, which prohibits harmless as well as harmful businesses, is
arbitrary and invalid. If that doctrine be sound, the Court could not have
sustained the Evanston ordinance if the Sunday operation of an automobile
agency did not affect or disturb the public welfare. If, according to the above
cases, the auto industry was harmful, a separate classification as to them
would still meet the mandates of the Eden decision because there would be
a reasonable relation to the health, safety and morals of the community.
The rationale in Courtesy when read with Humphrey and Pacesetter
seems to indicate a tendency by the Court to sustain Sunday legislation only
(a) when it includes all harmful industries and (b) does not include any
harmless industries.
The Illinois opinion in this case appears to be the minority view. Six
states have upheld Sunday legislation dealing solely with automobile deal-
ers.29 All the cases agree that such legislation constitutes a reasonable exercise
28 Id. at 465.
29 Mosko v. Dunbar, 135 Col. 172, 309 P. 2d 581 (1957); Tinder v. Clarke, 238 Ind. 302,
149 N. E. 2d 808 (1958); Diamond Auto Sales v. Erbe, 251 Iowa 1330, 105 N.W. 2d 650
(1960); Irishman's Lot v. Cleary, 338 Mich. 662, 62 N.W. 2d 668 (1954); Stewart Motor Co.
v. Omaha, 120 Neb. 776, 235 N.W. 332 (1931); Gundaker Motors v. Gassert, 23 N.J. 71, 127
A. 2d 566 (1956). Gundaker is significant for an additional reason. An appeal was prose-
cuted to the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C.A.
1257(2). In a per curiam decision, that Court dismissed the appeal for want of a sub-
stantial federal question. Gundaker Motors Inc. v. Gassert, 354 U.S. 933 (1957). The parties
were in that Court and the matter was considered on the merits. Deming v. Carlisle Pack-
ing Co., 226 U.S. 102, 108 (1912). The dismissal for want of a substantial federal question
should settle any concern over violation of federal constitutional provisions.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
of the police power. The two states which have held that similar types of
legislation were unconstitutional were Florida and Missouri. Decisions in
these two states can be readily distingusihed. In McKaig v. Kansas City,30
the Missouri Supreme Court held a similar statute unconstitutional. How-
ever, Missouri has a peculiar constitutional provision which provides that
whether a general law could have been made applicable is a judicial ques-
tion to be judicially determined without regard to any legislative assertion
on the subject.3 * The Court pointed out that New Jersey, Colorado and
Indiana had sustained a similar statute as being a question for the legislative
judgment but that under the peculiar provision of the Missouri Constitu-
tion, the Court was not bound by the legislative judgment. In Illinois, the
Court is limited to a review of the reasonableness of the legislative deter-
mination. The person attacking the ordinance carries the burden of proof
that the statute does not rest on a reasonable basis and no state of facts can
be readily conceived to justify it.32
In Moore v. Thompson,"3 the Florida Court struck down a similar type
of legislation on the ground that it was against the public policy of the
state.3 4 The case is clearly distinguishable. In Illinois under Humphrey the
public policy of the state permits public closing of businesses on Sundays.
Today, the automobile has become a definite and well established part
of our way of life. Its use, license, registration, taxation, insurance, theft and
many other related matters have received special legislative recognition and
attention. Certainly the legislature has treated the motor vehicle as a special
type of business. 3 The public has accepted it as such. To hold that it is
arbitrary and unreasonable action on the part of the legislature to place
motor vehicle dealers in a classification separate and apart from merchants
in general, would be to close our eyes to reality. To argue that similar abuses
as exist in the auto industry are present in other businesses open on Sunday
is to loose sight of the problem.36 The legislature is under no duty to extend
regulatory measures to all fields in which there may be abuses. It may con-
fine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be
30 363 Mo. 1033, 256 S.W. 2d 815 (1953).
31 Missouri Const., Art. III, § 40.
32 Union Cemetary Association v. Cooper, 414 Ill. 23, 110 N.E. 2d 239 (1953).
33 126 So. 2d 543 (Fla., 1960).
34 Supra, n. 33 at 551-2. "We are not unmindful of the decision of other states set
forth in the opinion and judgment of the trial court holding similar acts of other states to
be valid and constitutional. Most of these cases, and notably the cases from New Jersey,
Indiana and Michigan, plainly indicate the basis for upholding such acts to be the public
policy of such states for closing businesses on Sunday. Such, as we have pointed out, is not
the public policy of this state. The views of the courts of other states simply do not coin-
cide with the view we entertain of this subject." (Emphasis supplied)
35 Il. Rev. Stats. 1961, Ch. 95%, §§ 5-101, 5-102.
36 Tinder v. Clarke, 238 Ind. 302, 149 N.E. 2d 808 (1958) (because of competitive con-
ditions few dealers require all to be open and the noise and disorder created by dealers
being open on Sunday); Gundaker Motors v. Gassert, 23 N.J. 71, 127 A. 2d 566 (1956)
(some employees denied a day of rest and traffic problems created by the large amount of
motor vehicles visiting showrooms).
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the clearest.31 To remedy evils, the State legislature may move one step at a
time.3 8 It may operate in one field and supply a remedy while it neglects
others.
JOSEPH V. RODDY
CONFLICT OF LAWS-CORPORATIONS-WHETHER THE COURT OF THE FORUM
MAY DISREGARD SUCCESSORSHIP TO A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR A MULTISTATE
LIBEL VALIDLY ASSIGNED ELSEWHERE BY AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION
TO A NEWLY FORMED CORPORATION INTO WHICH IT HAS MERGED AND RE-
FUSE TO PERMIT SUIT BY THE CORPORATE SUCCESSQR BASED ON THE FORUM'S
DOMESTIC SUBSTANTIVE LAW-In Association for the Preservation of Free-
dom of Choice, Inc. v. New York Post Corporation,1 a New York court
had before it a novel and important question in the area of conflict of
laws involving increasingly significant problems in the multi-state libel
situation.
The defendant published a libel about an unincorporated group called
Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, which had members
in a number of states and the District of Columbia, on May 14, 1959.
The defendant's newspaper with the libelous article was circulated into
various states, including New York, and the District of Columbia. In
August, 1959, the unincorporated organization, pursuant to a prior unan-
imous agreement that it should incorporate in the District of Columbia,
and that upon incorporation the new corporation should succeed to all of
the group's members, property, and claims, incorporated the group under
the same name in the District of Columbia by having three residents of
District who were members of the unincorporated association secure a char-
ter with the same name and purposes as the unincorporated group pur-
suant to District of Columbia law from the Superintendent of Corporations
there. Thereupon, the membership of the unincorporated group merged
into the corporation, and the unincorporated group ceased to exist as a
separate organization.
In May, 1960, the corporation brought suit as plaintiff in its own
name as successor to the unincorporated group for libel against the de-
fendant newspaper. The court dismissed the claim. It held that although
a valid successorship might have been created in the District of Columbia,
the question presented was "the ownership of the claim or who may sue
under the law of the forum which governs the question of the capacity to
sue." Since it held that a libel claim was not assignable in New York, the
court concluded that "the resident of another State cannot avail itself of
37 Godlin v. Auditor of Public Accounts, 414 Ill. 89, 98, 110 N.E. 2d 234 (1953).
38 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
1 35 Misc. 2d 65, 228 N.Y.S.2d 767 (1962).
